The Expansion of Russia's 'Africa Corps' in Libya
Johannes Titus Jansen | 13 June 2024
Summary
Russia has deployed former Wagner mercenaries, now rebranded as the 'Africa Corps', to southern Libya, delivering military equipment and collaborating with General Khalifa Haftar, to expand Russian influence and support Haftar.
The presence of Russian troops in Libya will likely further destabilise the region, strengthen Haftar’s position, and facilitate Russian control over resources and military bases. This poses a major security risk to Europe and NATO, potentially influencing migration flows and increasing Russian power projection across the Mediterranean.
Short-term, the Africa Corps will bolster Haftar’s control and likely escalate violence in Libya, advancing efforts to establish a Russian naval base in Cyrenaica. Medium-term, Russia’s influence in Libya and the Sahel will deepen, increasing EU and NATO concerns. Long-term, if unchallenged, the Africa Corps’ presence will enhance Russian power projection across Africa and the Mediterranean, reshaping geopolitical dynamics but facing ongoing local resistance and international pressure.
A force of 1000-1500 predominantly former Wagner mercenaries and seasoned soldiers, now rebranded as the 'Africa Corps' or 'African Legion' under the Russian Ministry of Defence’s command, were deployed to southern Libya in early April. Russian cargo planes offloaded these troops in southern Libya, whilst cargo ships delivered 6,000 tons of equipment, including light and heavy pickups, transportation trucks, and anti-aircraft artillery, to the port of Tobruk. Collaborating with General Khalifa Haftar, these operations were facilitated by the strategically important Al-Jufra airbase, operated by Russia and serving as the Corps headquarters. Since being founded by Deputy Defence Minister Col.-Gen. Yunus-bek Yevkurov in December 2023, other Africa Corps units have been deployed in Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic. Russian mercenaries have been present in Libya since 2018, initially training Haftar’s troops, and have remained, with most joining the ranks of the Africa Corps. According to UK and French intelligence sources, selected Africa Corps units have been redeployed to Ukraine, participating in Russia’s latest offensive in the Kharkiv region.
The Kremlin’s strategic objective is to bolster its influence in Africa, where its mercenaries already control diamond mines, oil reserves, and valuable mineral deposits, leveraging military strength to expand its interests. In Libya, Moscow has exploited the internal rift between East and West, particularly in areas controlled by Haftar, through meticulous political, economic, and military infiltration. The country's instability has fostered violence and criminal activities, providing a fertile ground for Moscow's activities. Libya's complex political landscape, with two co-existing governments, two parliaments, and multiple authorities, has allowed Russia to deepen its penetration by supporting Haftar. High-level meetings between the LNA and Russian officials, including one between Haftar and Putin in September 2023, centred on enhancing military and logistical cooperation, controlling energy infrastructures, and influencing illegal migratory routes. Haftar requested additional military support to seize Tripoli and topple Libya’s internationally recognised government. Additionally, Russia aims to establish a naval base in Cyrenaica to project military power in North Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean. Libya’s oil reserves and geographic location, linking Sahel countries to North Africa and Europe, make it of vital strategic importance.
The implications of the Africa Corps' presence in Libya are profound, further destabilising an already volatile region. The Russian troops not only strengthen Haftar’s position but could also be deployed in Libya for military escalations against Tripoli. The proximity to Sahel countries suggests that Russian supplies will also likely reach pro-Russian juntas. The Africa Corps' presence in Libya and the wider Sahel region aims to secure Russian interests by controlling military bases and exploiting mineral resources, providing security and training services to loyal African governments, and influencing migration flows in the Mediterranean to affect European politics, potentially with a future 15000-strong Russian-controlled ‘border force’ in the Sahel. Russia has aligned its foreign policy with the Africa Corps operations, attempting to present itself as a security ally and guarantor for Sahelian states and Haftar. Its presence in the wider region represents a major security risk at Europe’s and NATO’s southern border, particularly with the growing threat of Russian naval vessels at Syrian and Libyan ports. This strategic move could enhance Russian power projection across Africa and potentially bring them into direct competition with European interests, challenging the stability and security of the region. Nevertheless, the Libyan Fatwa House declared ‘jihad’ against the Africa Corps in late May, viewing the Russian intervention as an occupation and ‘invasion by an aggressive infidel state’. As such, the Russian troops will likely face strong resistance, particularly in areas outside of Haftar’s control.
Forecast
Short-term
In six to twelve months, the Africa Corps will significantly bolster General Khalifa Haftar’s position, enabling him to consolidate control over key regions and potentially escalate military actions against Tripoli. Should their mission be offensive, the influx of Russian military equipment and troops will likely lead to heightened tensions and increased violence in Libya. Moscow's efforts to secure strategic assets, such as energy infrastructures, will proceed. Should ties between Russia and Haftar remain positive, establishing a Russian naval base in Cyrenaica will highly likely go ahead.
Medium-term:
Russia’s influence in Libya and the Sahel region will deepen in one-to-two years, with the Africa Corps playing a pivotal role. The Corps will likely establish a more permanent presence, taking control over local military structures and vital mineral resources. However, it will face difficulties controlling all illegal migration routes to Europe. Increased collaboration with pro-Russian juntas in neighbouring Sahel countries will solidify Russia’s strategic foothold. Supported by the Africa Corps, Haftar will likely launch attacks to capture territory and expand his power in Libya, though, this will be challenged by opposing forces, meaning the region’s instability will persist. European and NATO concerns will escalate as the Russian presence in Libya and Syria on land and at sea grows.
Long-term:
In three to five years, should the Africa Corps prove to be effective and remain supported by the Ministry of Defense, its operations will likely reshape geopolitical dynamics in North Africa and the Sahel, such as Haftar taking control of Libya. If unopposed, Russia’s entrenchment in the region will solidify, with significant control over energy routes, military bases, and key mineral resources. This sustained presence will enhance Russia’s ability to project power across Africa and the Mediterranean, challenging European and NATO interests. However, local resistance and potential international pressure may create ongoing challenges for Russian forces, leading to protracted conflicts.